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Recent theorizing concerning factors that affect 
cognitive processing during problem solving activity has 
postulated that simple or unambiguous versions of a problem 
task evoke more verbal than spatial processing, but as the 
task becomes more complex or ambiguous, spatial processing 
is used more than verbal processing. This project tested 
these assumptions by employing a problem task that is 
potentially solvable using either verbal or spatial 
processing: transitive inference, or the three-term series 
task (e.g., John is taller than Fred, Bill is taller than 
John; is Bill taller than Fred?). Problem complexity and 
ambiguity were manipulated in separate experiments, and the 
use of verbal and spatial processing was detected by 
interfering with each process selectively during the problem 
solving task. The project also examined the interaction of 
these manipulations with gender and individual differences. 
The findings indicated that making problems more 
complex resulted in a greater amount of spatial relative to 
verbal processing, as indexed by the amount of time taken to 
solve the problems. Solution accuracy was not similarly 
affected by this manipulation, however. Manipulating 
problem ambiguity did not produce a reliable pattern of 
effects on the relative use of verbal and spatial 
processing. Individual differences in preference for verbal 
or spatial thinking did not affect results, and the 
influence of gender differences on the results was 
inconsistent. Previous theoretical assumptions in this area 
were partially supported, but more work is needed to clarify 
our understanding of the various influences on cognitive 
processes during problem solving. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
During problem solving activity, people often report 
talking to themselves, going over the elements of the 
problem "in their heads." For example, faced with the 
perennial problem of quickly assembling a child's toy late 
on Christmas Eve, a parent might covertly verbalize and . 
manipulate the information given in the instructions 
("corners A and D both will fit into slot C so I can do that 
first, and then..."). Another strategy often reported is 
that of spatially arranging the elements of the problem "in 
their mind's eye." The would-be Santa thus might form a 
mental image of corners A and D fitting into slot C before 
making a decision about which parts to assemble first in 
order to finish the job quickly. 
Although other cognitive processes, such as long-term 
memory, are certainly used in problem solving, these two 
strategies or "modes" of cognitive processing concern "on­
line" working memory functioning (Baddeley, 1986, 1992). 
Working memory is conceptualized as being comprised of two 
"slave" systems: a verbal, language-based system, and a 
nonverbal, imaginal or spatial system, which are coordinated 
by a central executive component. Although it is possible 
that neither of the two slave systems is actually 
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"responsible" for the decision regarding solution during the 
problem solving process (see Logie & Marchetti, 1991, for an 
explanation of the central executive's role in decision 
making), it is reasonable to assume that the two systems 
provide input for problem solution in most situations. 
These two processing modes are potentially of vital 
importance to problem solving tasks that involve consciously 
manipulating and maintaining information temporarily in 
order to facilitate reaching a solution (Frandsen & Holder, 
1969) . 
In trying to understand problem solving, the question 
arises of why people report using one processing mode more 
than the other in certain situations. What influences when 
one mode or the other is predominant? The focus of this 
inquiry is on what factors affect the relative amount of 
input the two systems provide for problem solution. 
Relatively little is known concerning the identification of 
these variables. Determining what variables affect the use 
of verbal or imaginal solution strategies will increase our 
understanding of working memory systems in problem solving, 
a research endeavor which has only recently begun (Gilhooly, 
Logie, Wetherick, & Wynn, 1993). In addition, research on 
these variables has the potential to increase our overall 
understanding of the conscious, ongoing operation of the 
human mind. 
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Many variables have the potential to affect the 
relative use (and usefulness) of verbal and imaginal 
processing strategies in solving problems. The most obvious 
is the type of problem itself. Some problems, such as 
deciphering a code in which one word stands for another, 
lend themselves more to a verbal strategy. Other problems, 
such as determining mentally if all of your luggage will fit 
into the trunk of the car, lend themselves more to 
imaginal/spatial strategies. Most problems probably fall in 
between these two extremes, however, and draw on a mixture 
of verbal and imaginal processing. Clearly, the type of 
problem has the potential to affect the relative use of 
verbal and imaginal solution strategies. The effects of 
other aspects of the problem situation, such as how 
complicated or unclear the problem is to the solver, or how 
often the solver has encountered that type of problem, are 
theoretically more interesting. 
Elucidation of the variables affecting the mode of 
cognitive processing used in problem solving is still in the 
early stages. Recently, these variables have begun to be 
explored in a model postulated by Geir Kaufmann (1980, 1984, 
1985, 1988, 1990). Kaufmann's model assumes that 
imaginal/spatial processes are used "more" when a problem 
solving task has a low degree of programming, whereas 
verbal/linguistic processes are used more when a problem is 
more highly programmed. Degree of programming refers to how 
well-structured the problem is, or the extent to which the 
solver has a definite procedure to follow for the solution 
(Simon, 1977). When the problem has a high degree of 
programming, it is well structured and there is a definite, 
algorithmic procedure to solve it. When the problem has a 
low degree of programming, it cannot easily be solved with 
definite, predetermined procedure and so requires a more 
flexible approach. According to Kaufmann's model, this 
degree of programming is affected by the complexity, 
ambiguity, and familiarity of the problem. Highly 
programmed problems tend to be relatively simple, 
unambiguous, or familiar to the solver, whereas problems 
with lesser degrees of programming are likely to be 
relatively complex, ambiguous, or unfamiliar to the solver. 
The rationale for Kaufmann's assumption that imaginal 
processing (imagery) is used more than verbal processing 
(language) for problems with a low degree of programming, 
whereas verbal processing plays a larger role than imaginal 
processing for highly programmed problems, is based on 
functional differences between the two processing modes. 
Visual mental imagery is perceptual, specific to the visual 
modality, and holistic in nature (Finke, 1980, 1989) . It i 
thus well suited for simultaneously representing multiple 
elements of information pertinent to the problem task 
(Paivio, 1971, 1986). Language is more abstract and less 
perceptual than imagery in its form of symbolic 
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representation, usually linked to the auditory modality, and 
sequential/temporal in nature (Kaufmann, 1990; Paivio, 
1986). It is thus well suited for describing explicit, 
precise relationships between elements of the problem in an 
orderly sequence (Kaufmann, 1990) . 
Imagery may be particularly useful for some problem 
situations by providing a holistic mental representation of 
the desired "goal state" of the problem, as well as the 
initial state. This analog representation could then 
facilitate the discovery of a solution that will lead from 
the initial state to that anticipated goal state. This way 
of mentally representing the problem might prove to be 
useful and even necessary in a situation in which the 
problem is complex, ambiguous, or unfamiliar (i.e., low 
degree of programming). On the other hand, language is 
sequential, abstract, and precise at describing the problem 
situation, and thus might be more efficient with problems 
that are familiar, simple, or unambiguous to the solver 
(i.e., high degree of programming). 
For example, if the would-be Santa had never tried 
putting toys together before, or if the task seemed very 
complex or the instructions vague and unclear, then forming 
a mental image of the completed toy might reveal a way to 
derive a solution, perhaps by working backwards from the 
imaged goal state. However, if the would-be Santa had 
performed this particular task many times before, or if it 
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was very simple or unambiguous, then it is more likely that 
the steps in the solution process could easily be converted 
into precise, orderly verbal descriptions of relationships 
that could be processed quickly and efficiently, and the use 
of mental imagery would not be necessary. Although imagery 
is holistic and language is sequential, it is probable, 
according to Kaufmann (1980), that using imagery to solve a 
problem is slower than using language, because of the need 
to scan the image or generate multiple images searching for 
a clue to the solution. Therefore, when the degree of 
programming is high, verbal processing is quicker and more 
efficient than imaginal processing. When the degree of 
programming is low, however, imaginal processing is needed 
to solve the problem. 
Kaufmann's model has not been fleshed out or tested 
rigorously, and leaves some important parameters undefined. 
For example, the model states that particular cognitive 
processes are used more under certain conditions, but it is 
not clear whether "more" means more prevalent or more 
efficient use of that process, or both. Furthermore, the 
two types of processing, verbal and imaginal, have not been 
systematically compared while manipulating all of the three 
variables (complexity, ambiguity, and familiarity) 
postulated to affect the degree of problem programming. 
It is also not explicit in the model whether these 
variables have an effect between problem tasks or within the 
task. For example, it appears that the model's predictions 
would be weakened in a comparison of the two tasks described 
above, which involve the two extremes of verbal and imaginal 
processing. Just because an individual is highly familiar 
with the luggage arrangement task does not mean that more 
verbal processing will be used for it than will be used for 
a code deciphering task with which the individual is 
unfamiliar. It is assumed in this study that the 
predictions of Kaufmann's model refer to within-task 
comparisons, such that varying the complexity, ambiguity, or 
familiarity of a particular problem task, which can be 
solved with either verbal or imaginal/spatial processing 
strategies, affects the determination of which strategy to 
employ. 
One class of problems that has the potential to be 
solved using either processing mode is transitive inference, 
also known as linear syllogisms. The form of transitive 
inference that has gained the most attention by researchers 
is the three-term series task. In this task a subject is 
given two statements (premises) of the kind: "Joe is taller 
than Ralph. Ralph is taller than George." Then the subject 
is asked: "Is Joe taller than George?" There is 
considerable controversy concerning which mode of processing 
is used during the solution of these problems. (see 
Johnson-Laird, 1972; Kaufmann, 1984 for reviews). 
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According to one explanation, people form images that 
order the items spatially and then they use these images to 
deduce the answers (Huttenlocher, 1968). Although commonly 
called an imagery or imaginal strategy, this type of process 
is more specifically spatial. in that the items can be 
arranged in a "mental array" without actually visualizing 
any details of the items themselves. The position of the 
items on this array or "cognitive map" is all that is 
necessary for use as a solution strategy (Desoto, London, & 
Handel, 1965). This distinction between visual and spatial 
imagery has been made in working memory (Logie & Marchetti, 
1991) and other domains as well (e.g., Kosslyn, Brunn, Cave, 
& Wallach, 1984). For the purposes of this project, the 
term "spatial" will be used instead of "imaginal" when 
referring to this cognitive process. 
Another explanation for transitive inference solution 
is that people solve these problems verbally or 
linguistically, without imagery, by "marking" comparatives 
and encoding the lexical attributes of them (Clark, 1969). 
In this way, subjects might deduce the answer to the 
question by verbally working through the alternatives and 
eliminating impossible solutions. This strategy might also 
involve verbal rehearsal to assist in remembering the order 
of the items while deducing the answer. 
Several attempts have been made to reconcile the two 
opposing views. For example, Williams (1979) proposed that 
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the verbal model might be more applicable for the sentence 
processing aspects of the problem, while the spatial model 
might be more applicable for the actual solution of the 
problem. In defense of this idea he presented evidence 
which showed that response latency data supported the verbal 
model, whereas solution accuracy data supported the spatial 
model. For example, Williams' results supported the verbal 
model's prediction that syllogisms with the comparative 
"taller than" will be solved faster than those with the 
comparative "shorter than." Williams' results also 
supported the spatial model's prediction that syllogisms in 
which the first premise constitutes the upper end of the 
mental array (proceed downwards) will be solved more 
accurately than syllogisms in which the first premise 
constitutes the lower end (proceed upwards). 
Wood, Shotter, and Godden (1974) showed that both the 
verbal and spatial models might be correct, depending on how 
familiar the subject is with the task. They found that 
subjects were likely to use a spatial strategy initially and 
switch to a verbal strategy as an heuristic after becoming 
familiar with the task (see also Johnson-Laird, 1972). 
Other studies, however, have produced discrepant results, 
with some authors (e.g., Potts & Scholz, 1975) concluding 
that a spatial strategy is used, some authors (e.g., 
Richardson, 1987) concluding that spatial imagery plays no 
role in solutions, and some authors (e.g., Newsome, 1986; 
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Sternberg, 1980) concluding that a mixed verbal/spatial 
strategy is used in solving transitive inference problems. 
Except for the Wood et al. (1974) study on familiarity, 
however, these studies have not manipulated variables 
affecting the relative utility and effectiveness of verbal 
and spatial strategies. Due to the controversy over which 
processing mode is primary in transitive inference, and the 
possibility that one is predominant in one task condition 
and the other predominant in another condition, transitive 
inference problems provide a very useful task for 
manipulating variables beyond familiarity postulated by 
Kaufmann (1980, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1990) to influence 
selection of processing mode. 
The influence of problem complexity and ambiguity on 
which processing mode is predominant has not yet been 
incorporated into current models of how people solve 
transitive inference problems. For example, Johnson-Laird 
and colleagues (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1994; 
Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984) propose that people construct 
"mental models" of the problem elements when solving three 
term series problems and other forms of transitive 
inference. A mental model is conceptualized by Johnson-
Laird as a mental representation of the information 
presented in the premises that serves as a guiding framework 
for problem solution. This mental representation is 
different from a purely propositional (verbal) 
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representation in that it depicts relationships between 
elements in an analog fashion. A mental model can be in the 
form of an image in some situations, but also can contain 
more abstract, propositional information that is not 
imageable (such as negation). Johnson-Laird points out that 
very difficult (e.g., complex and/or ambiguous) problems are 
likely to provoke the use of more than one mental model 
during solution activity. The influence of problem 
difficulty on the use of mental models, with regard to the 
relative prevalence of verbal and imaginal/spatial 
processing involved, is not explicitly addressed by his 
theorizing, however. That is, factors such as problem 
complexity and ambiguity, that have the potential to 
determine whether a mental model is a mental image, or a 
more abstract representation containing verbal information, 
have not clearly been identified in Johnson-Laird's 
approach. 
Although problem complexity has not yet been 
systematically manipulated in problem solving tasks such as 
transitive inference, problem ambiguity has received some 
attention by Johnson-Laird's laboratory. Evidence for 
spatial processing being important for ambiguous problem 
situations was found by Bauer and Johnson-Laird (cited in 
Johnson-Laird, 1994). They found that subjects who were 
presented with diagrams depicting disjunctive syllogisms 
(i.e., describing several alternative situations) solved 
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them better than subjects who were presented with the same 
syllogisms in verbal form. Presumably, the "diagram" 
subjects were able to generate and manipulate images of the 
diagrams that enabled them to test alternative 
possibilities, thus facilitating solution. 
Other evidence for spatial processing playing a role in 
ambiguous problem situations was reported by Clement and 
Falmagne (1986) , who presented subjects with "if p then q" 
type syllogisms varying in imageability and solution 
determinacy (i.e., whether a statement about q can logically 
be inferred from a statement about p). For indeterminate 
syllogisms, performance was better for material rated high 
in imageability than for low imageability material. The 
authors concluded that indeterminate reasoning provokes the 
use of imagery as a way of elaborating on the representation 
of the problem. 
Overall, however, the scant body of evidence on this 
issue is as yet unconvincing. Systematic research employing 
more powerful methods is needed to clarify the effects of 
complexity and ambiguity on problem solving performance. 
Overview of Methodology 
Previous research on the use of imaginal/spatial 
processing in problem solving has frequently employed a 
method that may be of limited value. Some experiments 
(e.g., Clement & Falmagne, 1986) have indexed the use of 
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imagery by ratings of stimulus imageability, which may 
provide only a weak measure of the use of spatial processing 
(even items low in imageability still can be mentally 
ordered in a spatial array). For example, Richardson (1987) 
found no significant correlation between stimulus 
imageability and scores on a spatial ability test in a study 
involving transitive inference. It is not clear that 
manipulations of stimulus imageability provide an adequate 
method of detecting spatial processing. Further, the extent 
of spatial processing relative to verbal processing cannot 
be determined with this method. 
In order to examine the effects of complexity and 
ambiguity on the relative use of verbal and spatial 
processing during transitive inference, a method is needed 
that teases apart which processing mode is predominant when 
each variable is manipulated. Selectively interfering with 
verbal or spatial processes during the problem solving task, 
while manipulating the complexity or ambiguity of the 
problem, would provide such a method. Problem solving 
performance during selective interference should be impaired 
if the mode of cognitive processing being used to arrive at 
a solution is the same as that needed to perform the 
selective interference task, because of the competition 
between the tasks (Brooks, 1967, 1968) . In other words, it 
is more difficult to do two tasks that require the same 
processing mode than it is to do two tasks that require 
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different processing modes. Selective interference has 
proven useful in a variety of paradigms involving problem 
solving (Gilhooly, et al., 1993; Pezaris & Casey, 1991; 
Saariluoma, 1992), working memory (Baddeley, 1986; Farmer, 
Berman, & Fletcher, 1986; Logie, Zucco, & Baddeley, 1990; 
Quinn & Ralston, 1986), and categorization tasks (Hampson & 
Duffy, 1984). 
The choice of interference tasks for this project was 
made based on the special requirements of the method of 
presenting the problems, as well as the effectiveness of 
these tasks in previous research. Verbal interference 
consisted of requiring subjects to continuously repeat, out-
loud, a four-syllable word at their normal rate of speech, 
while solving each problem. Various forms of this 
articulatory suppression procedure have been used with 
success by many researchers (see Baddeley, 1986, for a 
review). Some of these researchers have used a digit 
counting task in which subjects count aloud from one to four 
(e.g., Farmer, Berman, & Fletcher, 1986; Longoni, 
Richardson, & Aiello, 1993). Interfering with articulation 
by using a digit counting task was deemed not desirable for 
this project because the task required subjects to press 
numbered keys on a keyboard, and digit counting might 
interfere with that process. Other researchers have used a 
sound (e.g., "blah") or word (e.g., "the") repetition task 
for suppressing articulation, where the words could range 
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from one syllable (Murray, 1968) to four syllables 
(Slowiaczek & Clifton, 1980). A four syllable word was used 
in this study in order to reduce the possibility of the task 
becoming too automatic and therefore less interfering. 
Subjects were instructed to repeat the word at a normal rate 
of speech (approximately once per second) because going 
faster would place too much load on the attentional system 
(Besner, Davies, & Daniels, 1981), and going slower would 
allow subjects to solve the problems verbally in between 
utterances of the suppression word. Allowing subjects to 
rehearse at their normal rate of speech should maximize the 
effect of the articulatory suppression. 
The spatial interference task chosen for this project 
was the same as that used by Gilhooly et al. (1993). This 
task required subjects to move their left hand in a 
clockwise direction (without looking at their hand), 
touching each of four knobs situated six inches apart and 
located in a square pattern on a panel to the left of the 
keyboard. Subjects did this continuously during the 
solution of each problem at a rate of approximately one 
second per knob. Like articulatory suppression, various 
forms of this task have been employed successfully in 
previous research to suppress spatial processing (e.g., 
Farmer et al., 1986; Gilhooly et al., 1993; Quinn & Ralston, 
1986). 
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Although visual presentation of the problem by itself 
may constitute some visuospatial interference (Brooks, 
1967), previous research on transitive inference has shown 
it to be too slight to be powerful at detecting spatial 
processing (Newstead, Manktelow, & Evans, 1982). Also, due 
to the complexity of some of the problems, auditory 
presentation of the problems using this procedure would 
create too much of a load on working memory (Johnson-Laird, 
1983). Therefore, manipulating mode of presentation as 
selective interference was neither feasible nor desirable. 
Some spatial suppression tasks have involved subjects 
tracking a moving object with their eyes (e.g., a pursuit 
rotor task; see Baddeley, 1986 for a review). For example, 
Baddeley and Lieberman (1980) used the task originated by 
Brooks (1967) that required subjects to listen to and recall 
spatial sequences of material (e.g., "in the middle square 
of a matrix place a one, in the square to the left place a 
two, in the square above place a three," etc.) and nonsense 
sequences (e.g., "in the square to the quick place a two," 
etc.). Pursuit rotor tracking during the presentation of 
these sequences interfered with the recall of spatial but 
not nonsense material. This evidence indicates that eye 
movements involved in visually tracking an object interfere 
with spatial processing. For this project, however, a type 
of spatial interference was needed that did not require 
visual tracking, because of the need for subjects to have 
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their attention on, and eyes focussed on, the problems which 
were presented visually. Fortunately, Quinn and Ralston 
(1986) have demonstrated that it is movement per se, and not 
eye movement nor the attention to the movement, that 
disrupts spatial activity. They employed the Brooks spatial 
sequence task described above and found that hand movement 
(as long as it was not in the same pattern as the sequence 
of numbers on a matrix) disrupted recall of the sequences. 
Indeed, recall was impaired even when the experimenter moved 
the subject's hand instead of the subject performing (and 
thus attending to) the movement. 
This project employed selective interference as a 
"double dissociation" method that more clearly detected 
whether verbal or spatial processing is prevalent, as well 
as defined the conditions that determine when each 
processing mode is prevalent. The method accomplished this 
by comparing accuracy scores and response latencies under 
verbal and spatial interference while systematically 
manipulating problem complexity (Experiment 1) or ambiguity 
(Experiment 2). Subjects were presented with problems that 
varied in complexity or ambiguity while simultaneously 
performing either verbal or spatial interference tasks. If 
relatively more verbal than spatial processing is used in a 
particular condition, then accuracy should be worse (and 
response latencies longer) under verbal than under spatial 
interference, because verbal processing is disrupted more by 
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repeating a word than by the hand movement task. The 
opposite result, that performance should be worse under 
spatial than under verbal interference, should be obtained 
if relatively more spatial than verbal processing is used in 
that condition, because spatial processing is disrupted more 
by the hand movement task than by the word repetition task. 
Additional Comparisons 
Gender comparisons were made in this study because 
considerable evidence exists for a difference between males 
and females in verbal and spatial processing on a variety of 
cognitive tasks (e.g., Burnett, Lane, & Dratt, 1979; 
Goldstein, Haldane, & Mitchell, 1990; Pezaris & Casey, 
1991). In general, males have performed better on spatial 
tasks (e.g., mental rotation) and females have performed 
better on tasks of verbal fluency (for a review see 
Halpern, 1986). 
Controversy currently exists, however, regarding the 
extent of these differences and the possibility of certain 
factors affecting these differences (Hyde & Linn, 1988). 
Recently, some researchers have concluded that gender 
differences have been exaggerated by past studies, and/or 
the extent of these differences is diminishing (e.g., 
Feingold, 1988). In addition, in spite of observed gender 
differences in verbal and spatial tasks, no reliable gender 
differences have been found in most verbal or nonverbal 
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reasoning tasks (Feingold, 1998; Linn & Petersen, 1986). 
There is some evidence, however, to suggest that 
differences between males and females exist on transitive 
inference tasks. Wood et al. (1974) found that males solved 
complex problems (with five premises) more accurately than 
females. Simpler problems were not used in that study, 
however, and it is not clear if those results would be 
replicated when problem complexity and ambiguity are 
systematically manipulated along with selective 
interference. Due to the controversy over the exact nature 
of gender differences in cognitive tasks in general, and the 
lack of clear evidence of those differences existing in 
specific problem solving or reasoning tasks such as 
transitive inference, this project included comparisons of 
males and females in the analyses. 
The influence of individual differences was examined by 
this project in order to ensure that effects of the factors 
under study, problem complexity and ambiguity, were not 
obscured or otherwise affected by these differences. 
Available evidence indicates that there is a wide range of 
individual differences in the relative use of verbal and 
spatial thinking (e.g., Haenggi & Steiner, 1989; MacLeod, 
Hunt, & Mathews, 1978; Richardson, 1977). Therefore, a 
further aim of this project was to determine whether the 
effects of problem complexity or ambiguity differ as a 
function of individual differences in preferences for 
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particular cognitive processing, or "cognitive style" 
(Richardson, 1977). 
The Individual Differences Questionnaire (IDQ), 
developed by Paivio (Ernest & Paivio, 1971; Paivio, 1971; 
Paivio & Ernest, 1971), provided insight into this issue. 
This 87-item questionnaire measures individual differences 
in the extent to which subjects prefer to use verbal or 
spatial processing in all facets of thinking. It has been 
validated and has good (r = .91) test-retest reliability 
(White, Sheehan, & Ashton, 1977) . Following Richardson 
(1977), who developed the 15-item WQ (Visualizer-Verbalizer 
Questionnaire) from items in the larger IDQ that pertain to 
cognitive style, a 12-item subset of the IDQ that is more 
relevant to problem solving was administered in this 
project. Not all items in this subset mentioned problem 
solving explicitly, but some did (e.g., "I often use mental 
pictures to solve problems"). Correlations were obtained 
between scores on this subset of the IDQ and all accuracy 
and response latency measures. 
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CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENT 1: COMPLEXITY 
One variable postulated to affect the relative use of 
verbal and spatial processing in transitive inference is the 
complexity of the problem. In Experiment 1, complexity was 
manipulated by varying the number of premises presented.. 
Although changes in complexity might involve changes in 
other aspects of the problem, it is reasonable to assume 
that this manipulation affects the complexity of the problem 
if other aspects are controlled. Some authors (e.g., 
Kaufmann, 1988) have suggested that a difference might exist 
in mode of processing as a function of the number of 
premises. Previous research employing transitive inference 
problems with more than two premises (e.g., Wood et al., 
1974), however, has not compared them with problems having a 
smaller number of premises, such as the conventional three 
term series (two premises) problems. 
Method 
Subjects. As one alternative in a course research 
requirement, 32 introductory psychology students at the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro volunteered to 
participate in the study. Half of the subjects were males 
and half females. None had any prior training in logic or 
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experience with transitive inference. 
Materials. Transitive inference problems were 
presented by an IBM computer using the Micro Experimental 
Laboratories, or MEL . (Schneider, 1988), software package. 
All problems employed one syllable male names and the 
adjectives taller and/or shorter. "Simple" problems 
consisted of two premises and a question (three term 
series). "Complex" problems consisted of three premises and 
a question (four term series). All problems had determinate 
solutions such that the question could be answered correctly 
from the information contained in the premises. Examples of 
problems used are: 
Simple (3 term): Jack is taller than Fred. 
Fred is taller than Joe. 
Is Jack shorter than Joe? (yes or no) 
Complex (4 term): Dick is taller than Steve. 
Steve is taller than Pete. 
Bill is taller than Dick. 
Is Bill taller rhan Pete? (yes or no) 
Previous research has found that the way in which these 
problems are worded influences how fast they are solved 
(Clark, 1969). For example, if the two adjectives that 
represent "opposite sides of the same coin," like taller and 
shorter, are used, shorter conveys more information than 
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taller. To say that one person is shorter than another 
implies that both are short, but to say that one person is 
taller than another does not imply that both are tall. In 
this way the adjective, shorter, carries more meaning and is 
said to be "marked" according to Clark. Clark found that 
marked adjectives slowed solution time of three term series 
problems compared to unmarked (e.g., taller) ones. Other 
aspects of wording, such as the congruence of the adjectives 
in the premises with the one in the question, and whether 
the first premise contains an item at one end of the linear 
set (end-anchoring), have also been found to affect solution 
time (Newsome, 1986). In order to minimize these effects 
and maximize the effects of the experimental manipulation, 
the problems presented to each subject were chosen randomly 
(without replacement) from a larger pool of problems which 
included equal numbers of marked and unmarked adjectives, 
congruent and incongruent wording, and premises that were 
end-anchored as well as premises not end-anchored. In this 
way the results were not affected by the particular wording 
of a few problems. 
Design and Procedure. A two (problem complexity) by 
three (interference type) by two (gender) factorial design 
was employed with problem complexity (simple and complex) 
and interference type (none, verbal, and spatial) both 
manipulated within-subjects. Subjects were tested 
individually. Instructions were presented by the computer 
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before the problems were presented, with the experimenter 
available to answer questions (see Appendix A). As part of 
the preparation for this rather complicated task, the 
experimenter also elaborated on the instructions and gave 
examples. Subjects were told that accuracy and speed were 
equally important, and not to sacrifice accuracy in order to 
go "real fast," nor to take an inordinate amount of time in 
order to try to get every one correct. Subjects also were 
told that how long they spent on both the premises and 
question was recorded by the computer, in addition to their 
accuracy. Instructions also stressed that performance on 
both tasks (problem solution and interference) was equally 
important, and that the interference tasks should be 
performed continuously and simultaneously with the problem 
task (i.e, not switching back and forth). Subjects were 
monitored by the experimenter during the task to make sure 
rate of responding to the interference tasks (approximately 
one second per word for verbal interference and 
approximately one second per knob for spatial interference) 
was kept consistent across trials. All subjects maintained 
consistent responding on the interference tasks throughout 
the experiment. 
The experimenter stressed that the subject's task was 
to determine who is the tallest of the people presented in 
the premises, who is the shortest, and who is in-between. 
This rank-ordering process and what conditions affect 
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whether it proceeds verbally or spatially are of primary 
interest here. The rank-ordering process is assumed to be 
of critical importance to solving the problem (Trabasso, 
Riley, & Wilson, 1975) . The problem task confronting 
subjects, therefore, was to mentally arrange the items 
(names) in order according to their comparative 
relationships (height). The question then posed to the 
subject served as a sort of "partial report" method of 
determining the accuracy of that arrangement. 
After instructions and presentation of sample problems 
to orient them to the task, subjects were presented with 24 
problems, 12 simple and 12 complex, in blocks according to 
level of complexity. Blocked presentation of levels of 
complexity was used in order to maximize the power of the 
method at detecting a difference in processing mode as a 
function of complexity level. Random presentation of 
problem complexity would not be as likely to be sensitive to 
the detection of a shift in processing mode according to a 
change in complexity. 
The order of presentation of blocks was counterbalanced 
across subjects and gender; half of each gender received 
simple problems before complex problems, and half received 
the other order. There was no break between blocks (i.e., 
the first problem of the second block appeared immediately 
after the last problem of the first block). Subjects were 
not told that the problems were divided into two types or 
that the two types were presented in blocks. For each 
block, one third of the problems was presented with no 
interference, one third with verbal interference, and one 
third with spatial interference. The order of presentation 
of the problems within each block was random; there was no 
predictable pattern of presentation of interference type. 
The problems were presented one at a time with each 
problem consisting of three parts: 1) a statement 
indicating the type of interference for that problem, 2) the 
premises, and 3) the question. Each part of the problem was 
presented on separate screens. For the first part, a short 
two word statement appeared for a duration of three seconds 
to inform the subject which interference task to perform, if 
any, for that problem. The statements, "respond only," 
"repeat imitation" (or some other four syllable word), and 
"move clockwise," were used to indicate no interference, 
verbal interference, and spatial interference, respectively. 
If "respond only" appeared, subjects solved the problem 
without an interference task. If "repeat (some word)" 
appeared then subjects said the indicated word (out loud) 
over and over from the time they saw this instruction,•while 
they viewed the premises, and until they answered the 
question. If "move clockwise" appeared then subjects moved, 
without looking, their left hand in a clockwise direction, 
touching each of four knobs on a panel. A cardboard 
partition between the panel and the keyboard prevented the 
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subjects from seeing the panel. As with the verbal 
interference task, subjects performed this spatial 
interference task continuously from the time they saw the 
instruction to do so until they answered the question. In 
this way, interference was presented during the presentation 
of the question as well as the premises (i.e., for the 
entire problem). 
For the second part of the problem, after the 
interference instruction went off the screen, either two 
(simple) or three (complex) premises were presented for an 
unlimited duration; subjects controlled how long they viewed 
the premises. All of the premises for each problem were 
presented together on one screen. Subjects were told to 
press a particular key when they had decided that they could 
answer a question regarding the height relationships 
described in the premises. Pressing the key terminated the 
presentation of the premises. 
The third part of the problem consisted of the 
presentation of a question immediately after the premises 
disappeared. The question asked if one person mentioned in 
the premises was taller than (or shorter than) another 
person. Subjects were instructed to respond to this 
question, as quickly and as accurately as possible, by 
pressing one key for "yes" or another key for "no." 
Response to the question was followed by a screen that 
provided feedback as to whether the question was answered 
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correctly or not. The next problem immediately followed 
this feedback screen. After the problems were presented, 
subjects were given a shortened version (pertinent to 
problem solving) of the IDQ (Ernest & Paivio, 1971; Paivio, 
1971; Paivio & Ernest, 1971), and then debriefed. 
Predictions 
Kaufmann's model assumes that verbal processing is more 
prevalent than spatial processing during the solution of 
simple versions of a transitive inference problem, but that 
spatial processing is more prevalent than verbal processing 
for more complex versions of these problems. For simple 
(three term) problems, this model therefore predicts that 
accuracy will be reliably worse (i.e, fewer correct answers 
to questions), and response latencies reliably longer, under 
verbal interference than under spatial interference. For 
complex (four term) problems, the model predicts the 
opposite result: accuracy will be worse and response 
latencies longer under spatial interference than under 
verbal interference. Thus a statistical "crossover" 
interaction should be obtained between problem complexity 
and interference type for Kaufmann's model to be supported. 
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Results' and Discussion 
Solution Accuracy. Unless otherwise noted, for both 
experiments all results that are reported were reliable at 
the .05 alpha level. For each problem, solution accuracy 
(correct answer to the question), response latency to the 
premises, and response latency to the question were 
recorded. Tables and figures for both experiments are 
presented in Appendix B. See Table 1 for the mean 
proportion of correct answers as a function of problem 
complexity, interference type, and gender. Correct answers 
to questions were analyzed with a 2 X 3 X 2 factorial ANOVA 
to detect differences between the levels of problem 
complexity, interference type, and gender. As expected, 
this analysis revealed a main effect of complexity, F(l,30) 
= 4.02, MSe = .04, with simple problems (mean proportion 
correct = .71) solved correctly more often than complex ones 
(.65). There were no other reliable main effects or 
interactions. However, there was a marginally reliable main 
effect of interference, F(2,60) = 2.40, MSe = .05, ID < .10, 
with none, verbal, and spatial interference resulting in 
means of .73, .65, and .67, respectively. 
The lack of a reliable main effect of interference was 
surprising, revealing that neither selective interference 
condition substantially impaired accuracy performance 
compared to the control condition (no interference). To 
check if this result could be due to the possibility that 
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subjects were engaging in a speed-accuracy tradeoff (taking 
more time for selective interference conditions than for the 
no interference condition in order to increase accuracy 
under interference), correlations were obtained between 
accuracy and response latencies overall and in all 
conditions. There were no reliable correlations, indicating 
that response latencies did not increase as accuracy 
improved. It is concluded that no speed-accuracy tradeoff 
occurred, and that the lack of a strong effect of 
interference on accuracy could be due to this dependent 
measure not being as sensitive to the interference 
manipulation as response latency. The range of possible 
scores for accuracy is much more restricted (limited, in 
fact) than the range of possible values for response latency 
(which is unlimited). The effect of interference on 
accuracy was marginally reliable and in the right direction 
(scores in the no interference condition were higher than in 
both selective interference conditions), so perhaps more 
problems and/or more subjects would produce a reliable 
effect. 
There also was a marginally reliable interaction 
between interference and gender, F(2,60) = 2.48, p < .10, 
with females appearing to have suffered more disruption from 
verbal interference than did males. Accuracy means for 
males for none, verbal, and spatial interference were .72, 
.70, and .64, respectively. For females, means were .74, 
.59, and .70, respectively. The biggest difference between 
the genders was with verbal interference, although this 
difference was not reliable at the .05 alpha level by a 
Tukey multiple comparison test. 
The influence of individual differences on the results 
was examined by scoring responses to a twelve item subset of 
the IDQ or Individual Differences Questionnaire (Ernest & 
Paivio, 1971; Paivio, 1971; Paivio & Ernest, 1971) that 
pertained to problem solving. Six of the twelve true/false 
items reflected a preference for verbal thinking if answered 
true, and six reflected a preference for visual/spatial 
thinking if answered true. The number of true responses to 
the verbal items minus the number of true responses to 
visual/spatial items constituted the subject's IDQ score. A 
constant was then added to eliminate negative numbers. This 
scoring procedure was used to place subjects along a 
continuum according to relatively greater preference for one 
type of process, verbal or visual/spatial, over the other. 
Thus a high score indicated that the subject was more of a 
verbalizer than a visualizer (greater preference for verbal 
than visual/spatial thinking), and a low score indicated 
that the subject was more of a visualizer than a verbalizer 
(greater preference for visual/spatial than verbal 
thinking). Notice that a subject could be placed in the 
middle by correctly answering all of the items, both verbal 
and visual/spatial, or by incorrectly answering all of the 
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items; both ways of answering indicate that the subject does 
not prefer one mode of thinking over the other. 
Correlations between IDQ score and response accuracy 
(overall and for each condition) then were performed. There 
were no reliable correlations obtained with this analysis, 
indicating that subjects' preferences for one processing 
mode over the other did not correlate with how accurately 
they solved problems in any of the conditions. This is 
somewhat surprising, given that verbalizers would be 
expected to have more trouble than visualizers with problems 
presented under verbal interference, and visualizers would 
be expected to have more trouble than verbalizers with 
spatial interference problems. To provide a validation of 
the scoring procedure, which might not have separated 
visualizers and verbalizers completely, responses to the IDQ 
were scored again. This time, separate scores for visual 
and verbal thinking were obtained for each subject by simply 
tabulating the number of true responses recorded for each 
scale, without subtracting one from the other as done 
previously. As before, there were no reliable correlations 
obtained between any of these IDQ values and solution 
accuracy. 
A final, post hoc analysis was performed to ensure that 
the order in which subjects received the blocks of simple 
and complex problems did not affect the results. Order of 
presentation of simple and complex blocks of problems was 
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counterbalanced across subjects, with equal numbers of males 
and females receiving each order. Order was not included in 
the design because there was no a priori reason to expect an 
order effect with the variables under study. However, it is 
worthwhile to examine the effect of order because findings 
in other areas of research reveal order effects when 
variables are manipulated within-subjects and materials are 
presented in blocks (e.g., Marschark, Cornoldi, Huffman, Pe, 
& Garzari, 1994; Richman, 1992). Order, with two levels: 
simple problems first and complex problems first, was 
entered into a2X3X2X2 ANOVA as an independent 
variable (between-subjects) along with complexity, 
interference, and gender. 
There was no reliable difference in solution accuracy 
between those who received simple problems before complex 
problems and those who received the opposite order, F(l,29) 
< 1, and no interactions between order and any of the other 
independent variables, all Fs < 1. This result was 
corroborated by the lack of a reliable correlation between 
order and solution accuracy. It is therefore concluded that 
the order in which subjects received the levels of 
complexity did not affect any results for this dependent 
variable. 
Response latency. As mentioned earlier, perhaps a more 
sensitive measure of the effects of interference lies in the 
amount of time it takes subjects to solve each problem. 
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Response latency has the potential to be affected more than 
solution accuracy because of its greater range of possible 
values. Response latencies to the premises and to the 
question were recorded for each problem. Before analyzing 
those separately, however, it is informative to analyze the 
effects of the experimental manipulations on the total 
amount of time spent on each problem. The total response 
latency for each problem was calculated for each subject by 
adding that problem's premise response latency and question 
response latency. See Table 2 for the mean total response 
latencies as a function of problem complexity, interference 
type, and gender. Total response latencies were analyzed 
with a 2 X 3 X 2 ANOVA corresponding to the design. As with 
solution accuracy, this analysis revealed a main effect of 
complexity, F(l,30) = 51.74, MSe = 14734765 milliseconds 
(ms), with simple problems (mean = 12.67 seconds) solved 
reliably faster than complex ones (16.66). 
There also was a main effect of interference for this 
dependent measure, F(2,60) = 17.01, MSe = 7687764 ms. Tukey 
multiple comparison tests revealed that spatial interference 
problems (mean = 16.25 seconds) took reliably more time than 
verbal interference problems (14.29) and no interference 
problems (13.46). Surprisingly, although verbal 
interference response latencies were greater than no 
interference, the difference was not reliable. 
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These main effects are qualified by a reliable 
interaction between complexity and interference, F(2,60) = 
3.64, MSe = 3472261 ms; Figure 1 shows the mean total 
response latencies as a function of complexity and 
interference (collapsed across gender). Tukey tests showed 
that for simple problems, verbal (mean = 12.80 seconds) and 
spatial (13.93) interference total response latencies were 
not reliably different from each other, and both were 
reliably greater than no interference (11.29). A different 
pattern emerged from this analysis for complex problems, 
however. Latency under spatial interference (mean = 18.57 
seconds) was reliably greater than under verbal interference 
(15.78), which was not reliably greater than no interference 
(15.63) . 
The nature of this interaction is evident in Figure 2, 
which depicts the amount of verbal and spatial interference 
adjusted for the no interference (baseline) condition for 
each level of complexity. This adjustment was accomplished 
by subtracting the mean latency under the no interference 
condition from the mean latency under each selective 
interference condition, for each level of complexity. Thus 
a large remainder, or difference score, indicates that there 
is a large decrement in performance compared to no 
interference (i.e., a large effect of that type of 
interference). This, in turn, indicates that the particular 
processing mode interfered with was used to a large extent 
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for that type of problem. The larger this difference score, 
the greater the extent of the use of that processing mode. 
A larger verbal than spatial difference score, for example, 
indicates that more verbal than spatial processing was used 
for that particular type of problem (simple or complex). 
Figure 2 shows that, for both simple and complex 
problems, the difference score for spatial interference was 
greater than the difference score for verbal interference. 
More importantly, perhaps, Figure 2 also shows that the 
verbal difference score for simple problems was greater than 
for complex ones. This suggests that simple problems evoke 
more verbal processing than complex problems, relative to 
their respective control conditions. There was no similar 
decline in spatial processing from simple to complex 
problems. In fact, there was a slight incline, as revealed 
by the slightly greater spatial difference score for complex 
problems than for simple ones. 
The above results are qualified perhaps by a marginally 
reliable three way interaction between complexity, 
interference, and gender, £(2,60) = 3.08, MSe = 3472261 ms, 
P < .10 (refer again to Table 2). For males, the difference 
scores for both types of interference were greater for 
simple than for complex problems (see Figure 3). Moreover, 
although spatial difference scores were greater than verbal 
difference scores for both simple and complex problems, 
there was approximately the same amount of difference 
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between the two types of interference for both types of 
problems. For females, a different pattern emerged (see 
Figure 4). As with the two way interaction, there was a 
greater difference between the two interference conditions 
for complex problems than there was for simple problems. 
Like the males, the females displayed a greater verbal 
difference score for the simple problems than for the 
complex problems, suggesting a decrease in the amount of 
verbal processing from simple to complex problems. Unlike 
the males, however, their spatial difference score was 
smaller for the simple than for the complex problems, 
suggesting an increase in the amount of spatial processing 
from simple to complex problems. A possible reason for this 
difference between the genders will be discussed later. 
Finally, as with response accuracy, there were no main 
effects of gender or of order. Also, there was no 
correlation between IDQ and total response latency (in any 
of the conditions). 
In order to pinpoint the locus of the effects described 
above for total response latency, and to further delineate 
the parts of the problem that are affected by the 
manipulations, response latencies to the premises and to the 
question were analyzed separately. The reason for 
partitioning response latency in this way is because the 
solution to the problem may well be arrived at before the 
question is presented, due to the nature of the task and the 
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instructions. The question was presented after the premises 
disappeared from view, so that subjects could not read the 
question first and then work backwards (or otherwise take a 
"shortcut") to arrive at the answer without mentally 
ordering all of the items presented in the premises. How 
they go about ordering the items, verbally or spatially, and 
what factors affect that ordering process, is the topic of 
study. The question then serves as a "partial report" 
method of detecting the accuracy of that ordering. 
In order to answer the question without the premises in 
view, subjects probably start (and finish) the ordering 
process while viewing the premises. Therefore, measures of 
response latency to the premises are likely to be sensitive 
to the selective interference method of detecting whether 
verbal or spatial processes are used more in solving the 
problem. Response latency to the question is less likely to 
show that sensitivity because the ordering of items has 
probably already been completed. Question response latency 
is therefore more likely to be sensitive to factors that 
affect maintenance of that order, rather than to the 
ordering process itself. 
See Table 3 for the mean response latency to the 
premises as a function of problem complexity, interference 
type, and gender. Premise response latencies were analyzed 
with a 2 X 3 X 2 ANOVA corresponding to the design. As with 
total response latency, this analysis revealed a main effect 
of complexity, F(l,30) = 74.56, MSe = 8857691 ms, with 
simple problems (mean = 9.26 seconds) solved reliably faster 
than complex ones (12.96). Also like total response 
latency, there- was a main effect of interference, F(2,60) = 
15.53, MSe = 7081287 ms. Tukey multiple comparison tests 
revealed that spatial interference problems (mean = 12.23 
seconds) did not differ reliably from verbal interference 
problems (11.44), both of which took reliably more time than 
the no interference condition (9.67). 
These main effects are qualified by an interaction 
between complexity and interference., F(2, 60) = 3.72, MSe = 
2526891 ms. See Figure 5 for the mean response latencies to 
the premises as a function of problem complexity and 
interference type (collapsed across gender). Tukey tests 
revealed that for simple problems, verbal (mean = 9.98 
seconds) and spatial (10.00) interference conditions were 
not reliably different, with both reliably greater than none 
(7.78). For complex problems, spatial (14.45) was reliably 
greater than verbal (12.89), which was reliably greater than 
none (11.56). 
As with total response latency, the locus of this 
interaction can be illustrated by a graph (see Figure 6) of 
the means adjusted for the appropriate baseline (no 
interference) condition (i.e., a difference score). Figure 
6 shows that for simple problems, verbal and spatial 
difference scores were almost identical, but the spatial 
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difference score was greater than the verbal difference 
score for complex problems. This reveals that there was a 
decrease in the effect of verbal interference from simple to 
complex problems, but an increase in the effect of spatial 
interference when problems got more complex. In other 
words, verbal interference was more disruptive for simple 
than for complex problems, but spatial interference was more 
disruptive for complex than for simple problems. As with 
total response latency, this suggests that simple problems 
evoke more verbal processing than complex ones, as evidenced 
by the simple problems showing a greater verbal difference 
score than the complex problems. Complex problems, on the 
other hand, evoke more spatial processing than simple ones, 
as evidenced by the complex problems showing a greater 
spatial difference score than the simple problems. 
Also obtained with this dependent measure was a 
marginally reliable interaction between interference, 
complexity, and gender, F(2,60) = 2.61, p < .10. For total 
response latency this interaction also was marginally 
reliable, and the same pattern was obtained here. Females 
displayed a greater verbal difference score, but a smaller 
spatial difference score, for simple than complex problems, 
suggesting an increase in spatial processing and a decrease 
in verbal processing from simple to complex problems (see 
Figure 7). For males there was no similar difference 
between the interference conditions from simple to complex 
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problems (see Figure 8). As with total response latency, 
there was no main effect of gender, F(l,30) < 1, and there 
was no reliable correlation between IDQ and response latency 
to the premises. 
The final dependent measure, response latency to the 
question, also was analyzed with a 2 X 3 X 2 ANOVA. See 
Table 4 for the mean question response latencies as a 
function of problem complexity, interference type, and 
gender. The results of this ANOVA were quite different from 
those of previous analyses. In addition to the previously 
observed lack of a main effect of gender, F(l,30) < 1, there 
also was no effect of complexity, F(l,30) = 1.87. The lack 
of a reliable difference between simple and complex problems 
in the time taken to answer the question could simply be due 
to the problem being solved during the viewing of the 
premises, as discussed earlier. 
A main effect of interference, F(2,60) = 21.96, MSe = 
1114678 ms, was obtained as expected. However, Tukey tests 
indicated that response latencies under verbal interference 
(mean = 2.61 seconds), were reliably faster than both 
spatial interference (3.82), and no interference, (3.66), 
the latter two means not differing reliably. The finding 
that verbal interference resulted in faster responses to the 
question than no interference is surprising, and could be 
due to the way in which the two parts of the problem, 
premises and question, differ in their demands on the 
solver. This will be discussed in more detail in the 
general discussion. There were no reliable interactions. 
In summary, the results of Experiment 1 revealed that 
for response latency to the premises, verbal and spatial 
interference did not differ in the magnitude of their effect 
on simple problems. For complex problems, however, spatial 
interference was more disruptive than verbal interference. 
Response latency to the premises appeared to be more 
sensitive to the manipulations than solution accuracy or 
response latency to the question. For example, although 
simple problems were solved correctly more often than 
complex ones, the effect of interference on this dependent 
measure was only marginally reliable, and there were no 
reliable interactions. For response latency to the 
premises, however, complex problems were viewed longer than 
simple problems, and selective interference was disruptive 
compared to no interference. Further, response latency to 
the question revealed no complexity effect, and the effect 
of interference was not as expected. 
There were no main effects of gender in' this 
experiment, but females appeared to show an increase in the 
effect of spatial interference (and a decrease in the effect 
of verbal interference) when problems were more complex. 
Males did not exhibit this pattern. The results of this 
experiment were not affected by variations in individual 
differences, and the order in which subjects received simple 
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and complex problems did not affect any results. 
Although Kaufmann's predictions were not fully 
supported by these results, it is noteworthy that the 
increase in premise response latency difference scores when 
problems were more complex was obtained under spatial, but 
not under verbal interference. This suggests that spatial 
processing is used more than verbal processing for complex 
problems, as predicted by the model. The model's other 
prediction: that verbal processing should be used more than 
spatial processing for simple problems, was not supported by 
the results, however. 
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CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENT 2: AMBIGUITY 
According to Kaufmann's model, the ambiguity of the 
problem situation is one factor, in addition to problem 
complexity and familiarity, that affects which processing 
mode is predominant. Kaufmann's model predicts that clear, 
unambiguous versions of a problem lead to more verbal than 
spatial processing, because the problem elements and their 
relationships can be mentally represented in a precise, one-
to-one way that lends itself easily to verbal descriptions. 
When the problem situation presents unclear, vague, 
ambiguous relationships between elements, however, spatial 
processing is assumed to be more prevalent than verbal 
processing. The reason for this assumption is that spatial 
processing in working memory provides an analog mental 
representation of the problem elements (perhaps multiple 
representations) that allows different possible 
relationships to be depicted and compared. 
For transitive inference, ambiguity can be manipulated 
by making the premises of the problem describe an order of 
names that is ambiguous with regard to all of the 
comparisons. For example, the premises: "John is taller 
than Steve. Steve is shorter than Jim" present an 
ambiguous, non-linear ordering such that it is not known if 
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John is taller than Jim. If the question asks for this 
unknown information then the problem cannot be solved 
(indeterminate solution). 
Method 
Subjects. As one alternative in a course research 
requirement, 32 introductory psychology students at the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro, who had not 
participated in the first experiment, volunteered to 
participate in the study. Half of the subjects were males 
and half females. 
Materials. Design, and Procedure. Experiment 2 
employed the same materials, design, and procedure as 
Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. All of tHe 
problems consisted of two premises (simple). However, half 
of the 24 problems presented to each subject were 
unambiguous and half ambiguous. Ambiguity thus was 
manipulated within-subjects in the same manner that 
complexity was in the first experiment. Unambiguous 
problems were identical to the simple problems used in 
Experiment 1. As with the first experiment, problems were 
randomly drawn from a larger pool in order to control for 
possible "wording" effects. All questions were followed by 
three response choices (yes/no/can't tell) instead of two 
choices. Subjects were instructed that some problems .would 
not be answerable from the information given in the 
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premises. An example of an ambiguous problem used is: 
Bill is taller than Jake. 
Jake is shorter than Sam. 
Is Bill taller than Sam? (yes/no/can't tell) 
As with Experiment 1, the way in which subjects 
manipulate the order of these items for problem solution, 
either verbally or spatially, is at issue. Therefore, the 
ambiguity of the presentation is what is being manipulated, 
not necessarily whether the solution can be determined. In 
the above example, if the question were: "Is Jake shorter 
than Bill?" then the solution would be determinate even 
though the presentation has ambiguous order with regard to 
all of the items in the premises. 
If all unambiguous problems have determinate solutions 
and all ambiguous problems have indeterminate solutions, 
then it is possible that subjects would learn to respond 
"can't tell" to all ambiguous problems, and never respond 
"can't tell" to unambiguous problems, without evaluating 
each question completely. In order to prevent this possible 
response bias, half of each of the unambiguous and ambiguous 
problems had determinate and half indeterminate solutions. 
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An example of an unambiguous problem with an indeterminate 
solution is: 
Bill is taller than Jake. 
Bill is shorter than Sam. 
Is Bill taller than Ralph? (yes/no/can't tell) 
The answer cannot be determined because Ralph was not 
mentioned in the premises. 
Comparisons and Predictions 
The same comparisons were made for this experiment that 
were made for Experiment 1, with ambiguity replacing 
complexity as a variable. Kaufmann's model predicts that 
for unambiguous problems, solution accuracy will be worse 
(and response latencies longer) under verbal interference 
than under spatial interference. For ambiguous problems, 
spatial interference will produce worse accuracy and longer 
response latencies than verbal interference. 
Results and Discussion 
Solution Accuracy. As with Experiment 1, for each 
problem, response accuracy (correct answer to the question), 
response latency to the premises, and response latency to 
the question were recorded. Correct answers to problem 
questions were analyzed with a 2 X 3 X 2 factorial ANOVA 
corresponding to the design. See Table 5 for the mean 
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proportion of correct answers as a function of problem 
ambiguity, interference type, and gender. As expected, this 
analysis revealed a main effect of ambiguity, F(l,30) = 
48.57, MSe = .06569, with unambiguous problems (mean 
proportion correct = .82) solved correctly more often than 
ambiguous ones (.57). Unlike Experiment 1, there also was a 
main effect of gender, F(l,30) = 12.97, MSe = .09338, with 
males (.77) solving reliably more problems than females 
(.62) . 
These two main effects perhaps are qualified by a 
marginally reliable interaction between ambiguity and 
gender, F(l,30) = 3.10, £ < .10, however. Tukey multiple 
comparison tests revealed that for females the ambiguous 
problems (mean proportion correct = .45) were solved 
reliably less accurately than the unambiguous problems 
(.78), but for males there was no reliable difference 
between the ambiguous (.68) and unambiguous (.87) problems. 
This suggests that females had more trouble with ambiguous 
problems (in fact were near chance performance for both 
types of selective interference) than males. 
The ANOVA also revealed a reliable main effect of 
interference, F(2,60) = 14.70, MSe = .045. Tukey tests 
indicated that accuracy under verbal interference (mean 
proportion correct = .60) was reliably less than none (.79) 
and spatial (.70), the latter two not differing reliably. 
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Final analyses for this dependent measure included the 
following. As with Experiment 1, to see if response 
accuracy increased as response latencies became longer 
(i.e., a speed-accuracy tradeoff), correlations were 
performed between accuracy and all of the response latency 
measures. No speed-accuracy tradeoff was observed as 
evidenced by the lack of any reliable correlations with this 
analysis. Individual differences were analyzed for this 
experiment the same as in Experiment 1. There were no 
reliable correlations obtained between IDQ scores and 
response accuracy. Lastly, with order entered into an ANOVA 
there was no reliable effect, F < 1, and no reliable 
correlations between order and any of the conditions, 
indicating that receiving ambiguous problems first did not 
differentially affect the results compared to receiving 
unambiguous ones first. 
Response latency. As with Experiment 1, response 
latencies to the premises and to the question were recorded 
for each problem, and the first analysis was performed on 
those two measures combined. The total response latency was 
calculated by adding each problem's premise response latency 
and question response latency. See Table 6 for the mean 
total response latencies as a function of problem ambiguity, 
interference type, and gender. Total response latencies 
were analyzed with a 2 X 3 X 2 ANOVA corresponding to the 
design. As with response accuracy, this analysis revealed a 
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main effect of ambiguity, F(l,30) = 25.34, MSe = 7877257, 
with unambiguous problems (mean = 14.60 seconds) solved 
reliably faster than ambiguous ones (12.56). The effect of 
gender was marginally reliable for this dependent measure, 
F (1,30) = 3.04, MSe = 110706292, p < .10, with males (14.90) 
taking longer than females (12.26). 
There also was a main effect of interference for this 
dependent measure, F(2,60) = 3.32, MSe = 6416929, with 
spatial interference problems (mean = 14.22 seconds) taking 
reliably more time than no interference problems (mean = 
13.10 seconds), by Tukey multiple comparison tests. Verbal 
interference problems (mean = 13.41 seconds) did not differ 
reliably from no interference. 
These main effects are qualified, however, by a 
reliable interaction between ambiguity and interference, 
F(2,60) = 7.56, MSe = 4983915. Tukey tests revealed that 
for unambiguous problems, verbal (mean = 13.20 seconds) and 
spatial (13.12) interference conditions were not reliably 
different, and both were reliably different from no 
interference (11.37). For ambiguous problems a very 
different picture emerges, with the no interference 
condition (14.84) not differing reliably from either the 
verbal (13.62) or spatial (15.34) interference conditions. 
The only reliable difference for ambiguous problems was 
between the two selective interference conditions, with 
verbal taking less time than spatial (see Figure 9). Note 
that the verbal interference condition also produced faster 
response latencies than the control condition for ambiguous 
problems. This result is surprising and makes 
interpretation difficult. It is apparent that without 
interference, subjects took a lot of time for ambiguous 
problems. Verbal interference, however, actually sped up 
processing time compared to no interference, although this 
difference was not reliable. The influence of question 
response latency on this result will be discussed later. 
The reliable difference between spatial and verbal 
interference indicates that more spatial than verbal 
processing was used. Finally for this dependent measure, 
there was no order effect (F < 1) and no reliable 
correlations with IDQ. 
As with Experiment 1, response latencies to the 
premises and question were analyzed separately. See Table 7 
for the mean premise response latencies as a function of 
problem ambiguity, interference type, and gender. Premise 
response latencies were analyzed with a 2 X 3 X 2 ANOVA 
corresponding to the design. As with total response 
latency, this analysis revealed a main effect of ambiguity, 
F(l,30) = 11.47, MSe = 5624065, with premises of unambiguous 
problems (mean = 9.88 seconds) responded to reliably faster 
than premises of ambiguous problems (mean = 11.04 seconds). 
This analysis also revealed a main effect of gender, F(l,30) 
= 4.40, MSe = 72457632, with males (11.75) taking reliably 
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longer than females (9.17). There also was a main effect of 
interference, F(2,60) = 4.37, MSe = 5247997, with verbal 
(10.80) and spatial (10.81) interference problems not 
differing reliably, and both taking reliably more time than 
the control condition (9.77), by Tukey multiple comparison 
tests. 
As with total response latency, there was a reliable 
interaction between ambiguity and interference, F(2,60) = 
4.37, MSe = 4620673. As is illustrated by Figure 10, for 
unambiguous problems both verbal (mean = 10.81 seconds) and 
spatial (10.26) interference conditions were reliably 
greater than none (8.58), by a Tukey multiple comparison 
test. The two types of interference did not differ reliably 
from each other. For ambiguous problems, verbal 
interference (10.80) did not differ reliably from spatial 
interference (11.37), and neither differed reliably from the 
no interference condition (10.96). In other words, 
selective interference did not interfere with premise 
processing time for ambiguous problems. Verbal and spatial 
interference means for both types of problems were all 
approximately the same. The main difference between the two 
types of problems was in the no interference condition. The 
interaction appears to be due to the increase in processing 
time for the no interference condition from unambiguous to 
ambiguous problems (a reliable difference), not due to 
differences between the two types of interference. It is 
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worth noting, however, that the interference means, although 
not reliably different, exhibited the pattern predicted by 
Kaufmann's model: verbal was greater than spatial for 
unambiguous problems and vice-versa for ambiguous problems. 
As with total response latency, there was no effect of order 
and no correlation between IDQ and response latency to the 
premises. 
The final dependent measure, response latency to the 
question, also was analyzed with a 2 X 3 X 2 ANOVA. The 
results of this analysis were quite different from those of 
previous analyses for this experiment. See Table 8 for the 
mean trial response latencies to the question as a function 
of problem ambiguity, interference type, and gender. As 
with total and premise response latency, this analysis 
revealed a main effect of ambiguity, F(l,30) = 43.27, MSe = 
859263, with responses to unambiguous problem questions 
(mean = 2.68 seconds) taking reliably less time than those 
to ambiguous ones (3.56). Inconsistent with the other 
dependent measures, this analysis also revealed no main 
effect of gender, F < 1. There also was a main effect of 
interference, F(2,60) = 12.72, MSe = 971073, with no 
interference (mean = 3.33 seconds) and spatial interference 
conditions (3.41) not differing reliably, and both taking 
reliably more time than verbal interference (2.61), by Tukey 
multiple comparison tests. Notice that the fastest 
condition, verbal interference, was even faster than the 
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control condition. This result also was obtained in the 
first experiment for this dependent measure, and a possible 
explanation will be discussed later. 
There also was a reliable interaction between ambiguity 
and interference, F(2,60) = 3.72, MSe = 660499 (see Figure 
11). This result indicates that the tendency for verbal 
interference (mean = 2.83 seconds) to produce faster 
response latencies than spatial (3.97) or none (3.88) was 
found only for ambiguous problems. Although the same trend 
was observed for the unambiguous problems, verbal (2.40) was 
not reliably faster than spatial (2.84) or none (2.79). As 
with the previous measures, there was no effect of order for 
this dependent measure, and no correlations between IDQ and 
response latency to the question. 
In summary, results of the second experiment revealed 
that for premise response latency, selective interference 
affected unambiguous problems compared to no interference, 
but the two types of interference did not differ reliably 
from each other. For ambiguous problems, however, 
performance in all three interference conditions did not 
differ reliably. For question response latency, performance 
was fastest in the verbal interference condition, especially 
for ambiguous problems. 
There were some differences between the genders, but 
they were not substantial. Although males solved more 
problems correctly than females, they took longer to do so. 
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Females appeared to have more trouble solving ambiguous 
problems correctly than males, but this was only marginally 
reliable. Finally, individual differences, and the order in 
which the two types of problems were presented, did not 
affect results. 
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CHAPTER IV 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The primary aim of this project was to determine the 
extent to which the processing mode used during the solution 
of transitive inference problems is affected by the 
complexity and ambiguity of the problem. Determining if 
these factors affect the relative use of verbal and spatial 
processing has important theoretical and practical 
implications in both problem solving and working memory 
domains. The results yielded some suggestive evidence for 
the influence of the complexity manipulation on use of 
processing mode, but evidence for the influence of ambiguity 
on processing mode was not uncovered. That is, manipulating 
problem complexity by increasing the number of premises 
resulted in a greater amount of spatial relative to verbal 
processing, as indexed by the effect on the amount of time 
taken to solve the problems. Solution accuracy was not 
similarly affected by that manipulation, however. 
Manipulating problem ambiguity by making some problems 
describe a nonlinear ordering did not produce a consistent 
pattern of effects on processing mode. Individual 
differences in preference for verbal or spatial thinking did 
not affect the results, and the influence of gender 
differences on the results was inconsistent. Although some 
results differed among males and females, there was no 
overall trend for the manipulations to have different 
effects as a function of gender. 
In the first experiment, the premise response latency-
results provided partial support for the hypothesis that 
more complex problems involve a greater amount of spatial 
than verbal processing. For simple problems, the effect on 
response latency was almost identical under both types of 
selective interference. For complex problems, however, 
response latencies were reliably longer under spatial than 
under verbal interference. This finding can be interpreted 
as suggesting that the simple problems in this experiment 
were solved with both verbal and spatial processing 
approximately equally, but that the complex problems evoked 
more spatial than verbal processing. Thus, for the complex 
problems, response latency was slowed under spatial 
interference compared to verbal interference. This was in 
spite of the complex problems having one more premise than 
the simple problems, which should have resulted in more time 
spent verbally processing the complex problems. 
This result is not fully consistent with the 
predictions made from the model described by Kaufmann (1985, 
1988, 1990). For Kaufmann's model to be strongly supported, 
the simple problems would have shown the opposite result 
from the complex (i.e., verbal interference resulting in 
longer latencies than spatial interference). Perhaps that 
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result was not obtained because the "simple" problems used 
here were not simple enough, at least not for these 
university-level subjects. One could speculate that if 
subjects were given simpler, two term problems involving 
only one premise and a question, that these "problems" would 
be solved with more verbal than spatial processing. Perhaps 
three term problems involving only one comparative, e.g., 
taller, would also be simpler and result in more verbal than 
spatial activity. The three term series problems employed 
in this project as simple problems might fall in between 
simple and complex, therefore involving a mixture of verbal 
and spatial activity. 
In addition, what constitutes problem simplicity or 
complexity might depend on how familiar the subject is with 
the problem task. Subjects in these experiments were 
novices at transitive inference; none had any pre-experiment 
training or experience at any form of syllogistic reasoning. 
With familiarity, the three term series problems in this 
project might become "simpler" to the subject and require 
less spatial activity. An effect of familiarity resulting 
in more verbal and less spatial processing was found by Wood 
et al. (1974). Future studies could manipulate more than 
two levels of complexity to examine the pattern of influence 
on processing mode, as well as the interaction of complexity 
with familiarity. 
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An alternative explanation for the greater effect of 
spatial than verbal interference on premise response 
latencies is simply that the spatial task was in some way 
more difficult or demanding than the verbal task. On the 
surface this explanation seems implausible because both 
tasks require little attention and effort by themselves. In 
addition, this explanation would not be tenable if there had 
been a "crossover" interaction obtained where spatial 
interference had produced a larger effect than verbal 
interference for one level of complexity or ambiguity, but 
vice versa for the other level. It would then be tenuous to 
argue that one interference task is more difficult for one 
condition, and the other more difficult for the other 
condition, without concluding that the complexity or 
ambiguity of the problem is responsible for this pattern. 
In agreement with Saariluoma (1992), it is argued here 
that the difficulty of the interference task cannot be 
judged on any absolute dimension, nor can a task that 
interferes with one cognitive process be compared as to its 
ease or difficulty with a task that interferes with another 
cognitive process. If an interference task is difficult or 
demanding, it is because it is tapping into the same process 
being used for problem solution. The difficulty of the task 
is inseparable from its role as interference. 
The lack of an interaction between ambiguity and 
interference as predicted by Kaufmann's model in Experiment 
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2 could have been due to the ambiguous problems simply being 
too difficult for these inexperienced subjects. As reported 
above, there was an interaction between ambiguity and 
interference for premise response latency. The interaction, 
however, appeared to have been caused by unambiguous 
problems showing a predictable pattern of both interference 
conditions taking longer than no interference, while 
ambiguous problems were approximately equal in all three 
interference conditions. It appears, that although subjects 
solved the unambiguous problems better than the ambiguous 
ones, and took longer over all interference conditions for 
ambiguous problems, receiving interference with ambiguous 
problems made no reliable difference, compared to not 
receiving interference, in response latency to the premises. 
There was a trend in the data in the direction predicted by 
Kaufmann's model, however. Verbal interference was more 
disruptive than spatial interference for unambiguous 
problems, but the reverse was found for ambiguous problems, 
although the differences in the means were not reliable. 
Again, it is possible to speculate that more training and 
experience for subjects would produce a reliable pattern of 
results. 
As mentioned earlier, premise response latency is 
arguably the best index of the sensitivity of the 
manipulations because of the task requirement of determining 
the order of names according to height before the question 
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is presented. There was less effect of the manipulations on 
solution accuracy (e.g., no reliable effect of interference 
in Experiment 1, no reliable interactions between complexity 
or ambiguity and interference), perhaps because of the 
restricted range of scores (zero to four for a subject in 
each condition). The range of values possible for response 
latency was potentially unlimited. There also was less of 
an impact of the manipulations on question response latency 
than on premise response latency (e.g., no reliable effect 
of complexity in Experiment 1). This was due presumably to 
the problem having been solved (the names ordered according 
to height) during viewing of the premises, with the question 
being answered without any further ordering necessary. 
The question arises concerning question response 
latency, however, of why verbal interference resulted in 
faster times than no interference (which was not reliably 
different from spatial interference)? This pattern of 
results occurred in both experiments. A possible 
interpretation of this result is that the ordering of names, 
whether via verbal or spatial processing, has been reached 
before the question is presented. Answering the question 
then requires maintenance of this order for a brief interval 
(question response latencies were much shorter than premise 
response latencies) until the question can be read and the 
correct key pressed. It is possible that although the 
ordering of names might proceed with either a verbal or 
spatial strategy, the maintenance of that order might be 
performed verbally. The articulatory loop system of working 
memory appears well suited for this task (Baddeley, 1986). 
Repeating a word might induce subjects to respond quickly 
before this verbal interference causes forgetting of the 
order. With this explanation, under no interference or 
spatial interference (which did not differ reliably from 
each other in both experiments) there was not as much 
urgency to respond, because there was little or no 
interference with maintenance of the order and thus less 
chance of forgetting. 
A final note should be made concerning response latency 
as a dependent measure. In this study, latency to both 
correct and incorrect responses was recorded and analyzed, 
not just latency to correct responses. The reason for this 
procedure was to maximize the sensitivity of the 
interference conditions at detecting use of processing mode 
(an interference task can slow performance by interfering 
with the cognitive process used to attempt problem solution, 
even when the subject makes an incorrect choice). It is 
possible, however, that guessing by subjects introduced some 
extra variability into the response latency data that might 
have reduced the sensitivity of the measure. Analyzing only 
the latency to correct responses has the drawback of 
producing less usable data, however, which also reduces 
sensitivity. This is a particular problem when the subject 
has only two or three solution choices, as in this study. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to each method, and 
previous studies have analyzed latency to all responses 
(e.g., Newstead, et al., 1982; Richardson, 1987), as well as 
latency to correct responses only (e.g., Clark, 1969; 
Huttenlocher, 1968; Williams, 1979) . 
Gender differences were examined in order to see if the 
well known superiority of males in spatial tasks, and 
superiority of females in verbal tasks (Halpern, 1986), 
would interact with this project's manipulations of 
complexity and ambiguity to affect use of processing mode. 
In Experiment 1 there were no main effects of gender. There 
were two marginally reliable interactions in that experiment 
worth noting, however. One was the finding that females 
suffered more from verbal interference than did males, as 
reflected in solution accuracy. This finding is in accord 
with previous research that found females superior to males 
in verbal tasks (Halpern, 1986) . The other marginally 
reliable interaction was the finding that females showed an 
increase in premise response latency under spatial 
interference, but a decrease in premise response latency 
under verbal interference, from simple to complex problems. 
Males did not exhibit this increase in the effect of spatial 
interference as problems got more complex. That result 
suggested that females used more spatial processing for 
complex than simple problems, but more verbal processing for 
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simple than complex problems. 
Interpretation of this result is also consistent with 
previous research on gender differences showing that females 
perform better on verbal tasks than males (Halpern, 1986) . 
With regard to this dependent measure, females showed an 
increase in spatial processing when the problems got more 
complex, but males did not. Assuming that females perform 
better than males on verbal tasks because of a greater 
tendency to use verbal than spatial processing, perhaps 
females need to engage more spatial, relative to verbal, 
processing for the complex problems than for the simple 
ones, because the increased difficulty of the complex 
problems forces them to resort to it. The males, on the 
other hand, are more used to spatial thinking and so do not 
need to use it to a greater degree when the problems get 
more complex. 
In Experiment 2, males solved ambiguous problems more 
accurately than females, but took longer on premise response 
latency. This apparently reflects a trade-off by which 
males were more concerned than females with getting correct 
solutions, even if it took longer. In this experiment there 
also was a marginally reliable interaction between ambiguity 
and gender in solution accuracy, where females had somewhat 
more trouble with ambiguous problems than males. Although 
this project did not provide evidence in support of a 
connection between ambiguous problems and spatial 
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processing, if there is such a connection, then females, 
with their greater use of verbal processing, would be 
expected to have more trouble with ambiguous problems than 
males. 
The only difference between the genders reported by 
previous research using a transitive inference task was 
observed by Wood et al. (1974). They found that males 
solved complex problems (with five premises) more accurately 
than females. In contrast, this project did not observe a 
difference in solution accuracy with complexity manipulated. 
In general, this study did not find a strong, consistent 
pattern of substantial differences between the genders on 
all measures, supporting Feingold's (1988) conclusion that 
males and females are closing the gap in cognitive 
differences. Similar lack of a difference in reasoning 
tasks was observed by Linn & Petersen (1986). 
Individual differences in preferences for verbal or 
spatial processing appeared to have had no influence on the 
results of this study. Consistent with previous research 
(e.g., Haenggi & Steiner, 1989), this project observed a 
wide range of individual differences in the reported use of 
verbal and spatial thinking, as measured by widely variable 
scores on the IDQ. There were no reliable correlations 
observed between IDQ scores and any of the conditions 
created by manipulating gender, complexity or ambiguity, and 
interference, however. Although the IDQ is effective at 
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measuring how people prefer to think (verbally or 
spatially/imaginally) in a variety of situations, this 
project's task was probably equally verbal and spatial. 
Verbalizers and visualizers were therefore both able to 
perform equally well, and the variables manipulated, 
complexity and ambiguity, did not influence verbalizers more 
than visualizers, or vice versa. In other words, being a 
verbalizer might mean that one prefers to think verbally in 
most situations, but is still able to think spatially when 
the situation calls for it. The same situation might hold 
for visualizers and thinking verbally. 
However, the result that IDQ scores did not correlate 
with any of the interference conditions, for any of the 
dependent measures, is still puzzling. For example, even if 
verbalizers can use spatial processing when needed, one 
would expect them to have more trouble in general with 
verbal interference than with spatial interference. As 
mentioned earlier, a subset of the IDQ that pertains to 
problem solving was administered in this project. Although 
some of the IDQ items used pertained to problem solving, not 
all did. Perhaps future research could include a more 
extensive questionnaire with all of the items designed so as 
to be more sensitive to detecting which cognitive processes 
are preferred for problem solving specifically. In addition 
to the questionnaire, a battery of problem solving tests 
could be used to provide additional power for detecting 
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differences between individuals in preference for use of 
processing mode during problem solving. 
This project helped to delineate two factors, problem 
complexity and ambiguity, that have the potential to affect 
the relative use of verbal and spatial processing in the 
solution of transitive inference problems. Previous 
theoretical assumptions in this area were partially 
supported, but more work is needed to clarify our 
understanding of the various factors affecting processing 
mode during problem solving. Although the generalizability 
of the results is limited to the problem task employed here, 
the foundation has been laid for future studies to explore 
the effects of these variables on other tasks. A systematic 
categorization of factors, and classes of problems that are 
affected by those factors, can then be undertaken that will 
increase our theoretical knowledge of verbal and spatial 
thought processes in problem solving. This will enhance our 
overall understanding of the roles language and imagery play 
in cognition. 
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Appendix A 
Experiment 1: Instructions to Subjects 
Welcome to the experiment, which is about solving 
logical problems. Don't worry, you don't have to be good at 
solving these type problems to do this task. Shortly you 
will see on the screen statements of the kind: John is 
taller than Bill; Bill is taller than Joe. Your task is to 
figure out the order of names according to height. When.you 
have done that, press the "1" key and the statements will 
disappear and a question such as "Is John taller than Joe?" 
will appear. To answer the question press "1" for yes and 
"2" for no. Try to respond to the statements and answer the 
question as fast as possible without making errors. Speed 
and accuracy are both important. 
For each problem, before the statements appear you will 
see one of three instructions. If "respond only" appears on 
the screen, just respond to the statements and answer the 
question as explained above. If "repeat imitation" (or some 
other word) appears, then repeat that word out loud (at your 
normal rate of speech, about once per second) until you've 
answered the question. If "move clockwise" appears, then 
touch (without looking) each of the four knobs to the left 
of the keyboard in a clockwise direction until you've 
answered the question. Do this with your left hand and move 
at about one second per knob. 
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Start doing this word repetition or hand movement task 
as soon as you see the instruction to do it, and continue 
doing it until you've answered the question (don't stop when 
the question comes up!). Remember, doing these tasks is 
just as important as solving the problems accurately and 
quickly. Any questions before doing some practice problems? 
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Appendix B 
Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
Experiment 1: Mean Proportion of Correct Answers to Problem 
Questions as a Function of Problem Complexity, Interference 
Type, and Gender. (Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Also note that means with an asterisk are not reliably 
different from chance performance, as measured by a t-test 
in comparison with a data set having a mean of ,50 and 
comparable variability.) 
Males Females 
Simple Complex Simple Complex 
None . 70 
(.21) 
. 73 
(-25) 
. 78 
.24) 
. 70 
( .25) 
Verbal .69 
( .30) 
.72 
(  . 2 2 )  
.69 
(.27) 
. 50* 
( .29) 
Spatial . 69 
( .25) 
. 59* 
(.24) 
.72 
(  . 2 2 )  
. 67 
( .20) 
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Table 2 
Experiment 1: Mean Total Response Latencies (in Seconds) as 
a Function of Problem Complexity, Interference Type, and 
Gender. (Standard deviations are in parentheses.) 
Males Females 
Simple Complex Simple Complex 
None 11.35 
(3.71) 
16 .20 
(5.43) 
11.24 
(3.27) 
15 . 06 
(4.77) 
Verbal 12 . 64 
(4.63) 
15.56 
(6.60) 
12 . 96 
(4.31) 
16 . 00 
(6.97) 
Spatial 14.14 
(5.96) 
17.68 
( 6 . 2 6 )  
13 . 71 
(3.96) 
19.45 
(5.71) 
Interference: None Verbal Spatial 
25 
20 
Simple Complex 
Figure 1 
Experiment 1: Mean Total Response Latencies (in Seconds) as 
a Function of Problem Complexity and Interference Type. 
Interference: Verbal Spatial 
3 
2 
0 
-1 
Simple Complex 
Figure 2 
Experiment 1: Total Response Latency Difference Scores (in 
Seconds) as a Function of Problem Complexity and 
Interference Type. 
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Interference: Verbal Spatial 
4 
3 
-1 
Simple Complex 
Figure 3 
Experiment 1: Total Response Latency Difference Scores (in 
Seconds) as a Function of Problem Complexity and 
Interference Type. Males Only. 
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Interference: Verbal Spatial 
-1 
Simple Complex 
Figure 4 
Experiment 1: Total Response Latency Difference Scores (in 
Seconds) as a Function of Problem Complexity and 
Interference Type. Females Only. 
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Table 3 
Experiment 1: Mean Premise Response Latencies (in Seconds) 
as a Function of Problem Complexity, Interference Type, and 
Gender. (Standard deviations are in parentheses.) 
Males Females 
Simple Complex Simple Complex 
None 8.29 12.55 
(3.27) (4.39) 
7.26 
(2 .37) 
10 . 57 
(4.19) 
Verbal 10.08 
(3.92) 
12 . 96 
(5.81) 
9.89 
(3.65) 
12 . 82 
(5.77) 
Spatial 10.29 
(4.66) 
13 . 93 
(5.48) 
9.73 
(3.30) 
14 . 96 
(4.58) 
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Figure 5 
Experiment 1: Mean Premise Response Latencies (in Seconds) 
as a Function of Problem Complexity and Interference Type. 
Interference: Verbal Spatial 
1 
0 
-1 
Simple Complex 
Figure 6 
Experiment 1: Premise Response Latency Difference Scores 
(in Seconds) as a Function of Problem Complexity and 
Interference Type. 
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Interference: Verbal Spatial 
0 
Simple Complex 
Figure 7 
Experiment 1: Premise Response Latency Difference Scores 
(in Seconds) as a Function of Problem Complexity and 
Interference Type. Females only. 
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1 
Interference: Verbal Spatial 
-1 
Simple Complex 
Figure 8 
Experiment 1: Premise Response Latency Difference Scores 
(in Seconds) as a Function of Problem Complexity and 
Interference Type. Males only. 
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Table 4 
Experiment 1: Mean Question Response Latencies (in Seconds) 
as a Function of Problem Complexity, Interference Type, and 
Gender. (Standard deviations are in parentheses.) 
Males Females 
Simple Complex Simple Complex 
None 3 .06 
(1.07) 
3 .65 
(1.75] 
3 . 98 
;2.33) 
4.49 
(2.12) 
Verbal 2.57 
(1.20) 
2  . 6 0  
(1.20) 
3 . 07 
(1.66) 
3 .18 
(1.46) 
Spatial 3 .85 
(2.32) 
3 .75 
(1-56) 
3 . 98 
(1.77) 
4.49 
(1.91) 
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Table 5 
Experiment 2: Mean Proportion of Correct Answers to Problem 
Questions as a Function of Problem Ambiguity, Interference 
Type, and Gender. (Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Also note that means with an asterisk are not reliably 
different from chance performance, as measured by a t-test 
in comparison with a data set having a mean of .33 and 
comparable variability.) 
Males Females 
Unambiguous Ambiguous Unambiguous Ambiguous 
None . 94 
( .11) 
.81 
( .27) 
.83 
(.18) 
. 59 
( .29) 
Verbal . 78 
(  . 2 6 )  
.53 
( .24) 
.70 
( .19) 
. 34* 
( .24) 
Spatial . 89 
(.13) 
. 69 
( .30) 
. 8 0  
( . 2 6 )  
.42* 
( .31) 
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Table 6 
Experiment 2: Mean Total Response Latencies (in Seconds).as 
a Function of Problem Ambiguity, Interference Type, and 
Gender. (Standard deviations are in parentheses.) 
Males Females 
Unambiguous Ambiguous Unambiguous Ambiguous 
None 12.71 
(5.49) 
15.90 
(5.38] 
10 . 02 
(3 .07] 
13 .78 
(3.72) 
Verbal 15.13 14.74 11.28 12.50 
(6.54) (5.73) (2.97) (4.36) 
Spatial 14.15 16.78 12.06 13.88 
(6.06) (5.16) (3.02) (4.94) 
Interference: None Verbal Spatial 
20 
Unambiguous Ambiguous 
Figure 9 
Experiment 2: Mean Total Response Latencies (in Seconds) as 
a Function of Problem Ambiguity and Interference Type. 
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Table 7 
Experiment 2: Mean Premise Response Latencies (in Seconds), 
as a Function of Problem Ambiguity, Interference Type,, and 
Gender. (Standard deviations are in parentheses.) 
Males Females 
Unambiguous Ambiguous Unambiguous Ambiguous 
None 9.74 
(4.39) 
12 .22 
(4.24) 
7.42 
(2.70) 
9.70 
(2.96) 
Verbal 12.52 
(5.74) 
11. 73 
(5.13) 
9.09 
(2.40) 
9 . 86 
(3.92; 
Spatial 11.32 
(5.23; 
12 . 96 
(4.31) 
9.20 
(2.66) 
9.77 
[2.99) 
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Interference: None Verbal Spatial 
20 
Unambiguous Ambiguous 
Figure 10 
Experiment 2: Mean Premise Response Latencies (in Seconds) 
as a Function of Problem Ambiguity and Interference Type. 
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Table 8 
Experiment 2: Mean Question Response Latencies (in Seconds) 
as a Function of Problem Ambiguity, Interference Type, and 
Gender. (Standard deviations are in parentheses.) 
Males Females 
Unambiguous Ambiguous Unambiguous Ambiguous 
None 2.97 
:i.33) 
3 .68 
(1.53) 
2.61 
(0.94) 
4 . 08 
(1.36) 
Verbal 2.61 
(1.12) 
3.01 
(1.06) 
2 .19 
(0.80) 
2 . 64 
(0.95] 
Spatial 2.83 3.82 2.86 4.11 
(1.14) (1.25) (1.32) (2.39) 
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Interference: None Verbal Spatial 
Unambiguous Ambiguous 
Figure 11 
Experiment 2: Mean Question Response Latencies (in Seconds) 
as a Function of Problem Ambiguity and Interference Type. 
